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A B S T R A C T
With the rapid technological advancements in the Internet of Things (IoT), wireless communication and cloud
computing, smart health is expected to enable comprehensive and qualiﬁed healthcare services. It is important
to ensure security and eﬃciency in smart health. However, existing smart health systems still have challenging
issues, such as aggregate authentication, ﬁne-grained access control and privacy protection. In this paper, we
address these issues by introducing SSH, a Secure Smart Health system with privacy-aware aggregate authenti-
cation and access control in IoT. In SSH, privacy-aware aggregate authentication is enabled by an anonymous
certiﬁcateless aggregate signature scheme, in which users’ identity information is protected based on symmet-
ric encryption mechanisms. In addition, privacy-aware access control is based on anonymous attribute-based
encryption technologies. Our formal security proofs indicate that SSH achieves batch authentication and non-
repudiation under the Computational Diﬃe-Hellman assumption. Extensive experimental results and perfor-
mance comparisons show that SSH is practical in terms of computation cost and communication overheads.
1. Introduction
The improvement of people’s living standards makes qualiﬁed
healthcare services attractive which have recently drawn worldwide
attentions. In particular, the advancements in the Internet of Things
(IoT) and wireless communication technologies make the collection of
health data more and more convenient. As a context-aware comple-
ment of health services in mobile scenarios and smart cities, IoT enabled
smart health signiﬁcantly promotes the scale and ﬂexibility of data col-
lection. To make the most of collected health data, which is called smart
health records (SHRs), it is necessary to design a secure and eﬃcient
health data sharing system. The integration of IoT and cloud comput-
ing technologies has become a promising solution to the above prob-
lem. As shown in Fig. 1, diﬀerent types of smart devices can collect
SHRs and outsource them to the cloud server for storage and sharing.
As we know, health data is usually sensitive and related to people’s
lives. Therefore, security and privacy protection measures should be
adopted to eliminate erroneous SHRs from malicious users and prevent
∗ Corresponding author. School of Electronics and Information, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, 710129, China.
E-mail addresses: yinghuizhang@smu.edu.sg (Y. Zhang), robertdeng@smu.edu.sg (R.H. Deng), hangang021@gmail.com (G. Han), zhengdong@xupt.edu.cn
(D. Zheng).
privacy leakage of SHR owners. Most importantly, SHRs should be col-
lected in a timely fashion to respond to such time-sensitive scenarios as
the medical emergency. Generally, it is still necessary to simultaneously
address the issues of aggregate authentication, ﬁne-grained access control
and privacy protection to realize a secure and eﬃcient smart health sys-
tem.
In smart health, a large number of IoT devices collect SHRs and
transmit them to a cloud service provider (CSP) for storage and sharing
among diﬀerent users. Upon receiving SHRs from diﬀerent IoT devices,
CSP should check the validity of the SHRs, which can be realized by
the digital signature technology. However, if CSP performs the veriﬁ-
cation one by one, the computation time will increase with the num-
ber of SHRs, which is not suitable for the time-sensitive medical emer-
gency. The technique of aggregate authentication allows CSP to check
many SHRs at one time and hence should be enabled to improve the
veriﬁcation eﬃciency (Boneh et al., 2003). However, most of existing
aggregate authentication cannot protect users’ identity privacy. Besides
SHR storage, ﬁne-grained access control of SHRs is important for practi-
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Fig. 1. Smart health integrating IoT and cloud computing.
cal applications because diﬀerent users usually have diverse attributes.
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is envisioned as a highly promising
technique which can be used to realize ﬁne-grained access control
mechanisms (Sahai and Waters, 2005). In a desirable smart health sys-
tem, it is indispensable to combine the aggregate authentication tech-
nology and ABE in a privacy-aware manner. To be speciﬁc, users’ public
keys such as identity and attributes cannot be known to adversaries. To
the authors’ knowledge, most of previous health-related schemes cannot
authenticate the collected SHRs at one time while enabling ﬁne-grained
access control and ensuring users’ privacy protection.
1.1. Our contribution
In this paper, we simultaneously address the data security and pri-
vacy issues in IoT enabled smart health by introducing SSH, a Secure
Smart Health system with privacy-aware aggregate authentication and
ﬁne-grained access control. In SSH, we focus on the aforementioned
issues including aggregate authentication, ﬁne-grained access control
and privacy protection. Our contributions can be summarized as fol-
lows.
• Firstly, we propose an anonymous certiﬁcateless aggregate signa-
ture scheme, which serves as a fundamental building block of SSH.
The signature scheme is used by CSP to aggregate SHRs from dif-
ferent IoT terminals and then authenticate the collected data at one
time. To enable ﬁne-grained access control, we combine the pro-
posed aggregate signature scheme and anonymous attribute-based
encryption techniques, and hence unauthorized users cannot access
corresponding SHRs.
• Secondly, we formally prove the security of SSH in the random ora-
cle model under the Computational Diﬃe-Hellman (CDH) assump-
tion. In particular, the proposed signature scheme is existentially
unforgeable against adaptively chosen-message attacks, which can
prevent invalid SHRs from being uploaded to CSP. The authenti-
cation is key-escrow free because the signing secret key is jointly
generated by the user and the registration center.
• Finally, we analyze the security features, computation cost and com-
munication overhead of SSH. Our extensive experiments based on a
laptop and a smart mobile phone indicate that SSH is more eﬃcient
than other related schemes in terms of the signing time, the veriﬁ-
cation time, and the aggregate veriﬁcation time.
1.2. Related work
In the era of IoT and cloud computing, smart health is indispensable
for the realization of proactive and comprehensive healthcare, which
enables the early-stage diagnosis. For a secure smart health system,
many security technologies should be adopted, such as authentication
(Shen et al., 2018a; Xu et al., 2018), access control (Li et al., 2018a;
Castiglione et al., 2016), and network security solutions (Zhang et al.,
2014; Fan et al., 2017), etc.
IoT and cloud computing. To achieve a secure IoT environment, Wang
et al. (2018) proposed a security mechanism in IoT based on an instant
encrypted transmission. Shen et al. (2018b) proposed a secure data
uploading scheme for smart home systems. Jhaveri et al. (2018) made
a sensitivity analysis of an attack pattern discovery in industrial IoT.
Besides IoT security, cloud computing security is very important for
smart health storage and sharing. Wu et al. (2018) proposed a biometric
key generation method for ﬂexible authentication in cloud computing.
Yang et al. (2018) proposed a remote data encryption mechanism for
mobile cloud computing. Zhang et al. (2018a) proposed an eﬃcient and
privacy-aware data sharing scheme for cloud storage. Li et al. (2015)
proposed a secure data deduplication scheme for hybrid clouds. Wang
et al. (2011) proposed a method of ensuring data integrity in cloud
computing. Based on blockchain technologies, Zhang et al. (2018b) pro-
posed a trustworthy searchable encryption scheme in cloud computing.
The scheme realizes two-side veriﬁability and can resist malicious users
and malicious cloud servers. Many other IoT and cloud computing secu-
rity schemes (Jiang et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2016a,
2017; Shu et al., 2018a, 2018b; Cai et al., 2017) have been proposed in
recent years. Particularly, the promising blockchain technologies have
been used to realize decentralized outsourcing services such as provable
data possession, searchable encryption and outsourcing computation in
cloud computing (Zhang et al., 2018c, 2018d).
Authentication. As a basic requirement in IoT enabled smart health,
authentication can be realized by digital signature techniques. How-
ever, traditional signature schemes cannot realize aggregate authenti-
cation and hence suﬀer eﬃciency drawbacks. Boneh et al. (2003) pro-
posed a novel technique called aggregate signature, which can be used
to reduce the veriﬁcation cost. Selvi et al. (2012) proposed an identity-
based partial aggregate signature scheme without bilinear pairing oper-
ations. Shen et al. (2017) proposed identity-based aggregate signature
scheme for wireless sensor networks. To further address the key-escrow
problem in aggregate signature, Castro and Dahab (2007) proposed the
notion of certiﬁcateless aggregate signature. Xiong et al. (2013) pro-
posed a certiﬁcateless aggregate signature scheme with constant bilin-
ear pairing operations. However, He et al. (2014) pointed that the
scheme (Xiong et al., 2013) cannot resist forgery attacks and presented
an improved scheme. Very recently, Li et al. (2018b) have showed that
the improved scheme (He et al., 2014) is not secure if the key generator
center is malicious-but-passive. Tu et al. (2014) also pointed that the
scheme (Xiong et al., 2013) cannot resist forgery attacks and presented
a new improved scheme. Malhi and Batra (2015) proposed a certiﬁcate-
less aggregate signature scheme suitable for vehicular ad-hoc networks.
Chu et al. (2014) proposed a key-aggregate cryptosystem for scalable
data sharing in cloud storage.
Access control. In cloud computing, ABE is a promising tool for realiz-
ing ﬁne-grained access control. ABE is categorized into key-policy ABE
(KP-ABE) and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) (Goyal et al., 2006). In
smart health, CP-ABE is very useful because it enables SHR owners to
determine the authorized users. In CP-ABE, a user can apply an attribute
secret key based on his attribute list, which is used to decrypt SHR
ciphertexts. The ciphertext is generated under ciphertext policy and
the decryption is successful only if the user’s attribute list satisﬁes the
policy. Zhang et al. (2016b) proposed an eﬃcient attribute-based data
sharing scheme for mobile cloud computing, in which decryption only
needs constant bilinear pairing operations. Wang et al. (2017) proposed
a directly revocable attribute-based encryption scheme and showed its
applications in cloud storage. In particular, access control suitable for
resource-constrained users (Zhang et al., 2018e) and access control with
leakage resilience (Zhang et al., 2018f) have been studied.
Privacy protection. In smart health, privacy is a very important issue.
Very recently, Liu et al. (2018) proposed an anonymous certiﬁcate-
less aggregate signature for mobile healthcare crowd sensing. How-
ever, the scheme suﬀers signature forgery attacks from malicious par-
ticipants because the relationship between the public key and the par-
tial private key is not reﬂected in the signature (Zhang et al., 2018g).
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Zhang et al. (2018h) proposed a policy-hiding access control scheme to
address security and privacy issues in smart health. In recent years, pri-
vacy protection technologies have received more and more attentions
such as accountability in cloud computing (Xhafa et al., 2015) and 5G
security (Zhang et al., 2018i). Nevertheless, previous schemes cannot
simultaneously address the aforementioned security and privacy issues
in IoT enabled smart health.
1.3. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Some preliminaries are
reviewed in Section 2. We then give the system architecture, adversary
model and deﬁnitions in Section 3. The proposed smart health system
is detailed in Section 4 followed by its security analysis in Section 5.
Our experimental results are presented in Section 6. Finally, concluding
remarks are made in Section 7.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notations
In Table 1, we describe notations used throughout this paper.
2.2. Bilinear pairing
Let 𝔾 and 𝔾T be a cyclic additive and a multiplicative group of
the same prime order p, respectively. We call ê a bilinear pairing if
for P,Q ∈ 𝔾, ê ∶ 𝔾 × 𝔾 → 𝔾T is a map satisfying the following three
properties:
1. Bilinear: ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P,Q)ab for a, b ∈ ℤ∗p .
2. Non-degenerate: There exists P,Q ∈ 𝔾 such that ê(P, Q) ≠ 1.
3. Computable: ê(P, Q) can be eﬃciently computed.
2.3. Number-theoretic problem and assumption
Computation Diﬃe-Hellman (CDH) Problem: Given a tuple
(P, aP, bP) ∈ 𝔾3, compute abP ∈ 𝔾. An algorithm  is said to solve the
CDH problem in 𝔾 with an advantage 𝜖 if
Pr [(P, aP, bP) = abP ] ≥ 𝜖,
where the probability is over the random choice of P ∈ 𝔾, a, b ∈ ℤ∗p ,
and the random coins used by .
CDH Assumption: The CDH assumption is said to hold in 𝔾 if no
polynomial-time algorithm has a non-negligible advantage in solving
the CDH problem in 𝔾.
3. Model, design goal and deﬁnition
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the system architecture of SSH and
then give the adversary model and design goals. Finally, we present
related deﬁnitions.
3.1. System model
As shown in Fig. 2, the system model of SSH involves a registration
center (RC), data owners (DO), data users (DU) and a cloud service
provider (CSP). These entities are detailed as follows:
• RC is responsible for the registration of DO and DU. In SSH, both
DO and DU will not fully trust RC, that is, RC may maliciously use
partial secret parameters which are generated by RC for DO and DU.
In the process, the identity privacy is realized because the identity
ciphertext is used by RC.
• DO collects SHRs based on various smart terminals, such as smart
devices and wireless sensors. DO generates secret parameters him-
self and also obtains the other secret parameter partially generated
by RC. In order to realize privacy-preserving ﬁne-grained access
control over SHRs and SHR authentication, DO encrypts SHRs and
generates a certiﬁcateless signature of the SHR ciphertext. Both the
ciphertext and the signature are sent to CSP for storage and sharing.
• CSP enables privacy-preserving SHR storage and management. In
order to reduce the computation cost, CSP will anonymously aggre-
gate the received SHR ciphertext and signature. CSP can check the
validity of received signatures at one time. If and only if the veriﬁca-
tion result is true, CSP stores the corresponding SHR ciphertexts and
signatures, which will be accessed by DU. In the process of aggre-
gation and veriﬁcation, DO’s privacy is preserved because his actual
identity is not revealed to CSP.
• DU intends to get SHRs from CSP for particular use in practice. DU
can be a doctor, a researcher, or a hospital, etc. It is signiﬁcant
to ensure that only authorized DU can access corresponding SHRs.
Similar to DO, DU can get his secret parameters including a user
secret key and a partial secret key from RC. After downloading out-
sourced SHR, DU ﬁrst checks the validity based on the signature and
then decrypts the ciphertext. If and only if his attributes satisfy the
underlying ciphertext policy, the original SHR can be recovered.
3.2. Adversary model and design goals
In SSH, no trusted entities are required. Speciﬁcally, DO may mali-
ciously outsource invalid SHRs to CSP, which can lead to severe results
if the SHR is adopted by DU in practical applications. DO also tries
to forge signatures of randomly chosen SHRs on behalf of other data
owners. CSP may also forge signatures on randomly chosen SHRs and
tries to reveal the actual identity of DO corresponding to a SHR. DU
wants to access SHRs even if he is not an authorized user. Particularly,
diﬀerent UDs may collude with each other to access some SHRs which
cannot be accessed by each of them individually. Most importantly,
RC is not a fully trusted entity, and it may be compromised by adver-
saries.
In general, we aim to realize a secure and eﬃcient smart health
system supporting privacy protection, authentication and ﬁne-grained
access control. Concretely, SSH should achieve the following security
and performance goals.
Table 1
Notations used in SSH.
Notation Meaning Notation Meaning
RC The registration center p A prime
DO The data owner 𝔾 A cyclic additive group of order p
DU The data user 𝔾T A cyclic multiplicative group of order p
CSP The cloud service provider Hi Secure hash functions
upkID The user public key of ID TS A timestamp
uskID The user secret key of ID TE The expiration date of registration
pskID The partial user secret key of ID (mi, 𝜎 i) A message and signature pair of IDi
L An attribute list skL The attribute secret key of L
W A ciphertext policy ctW A ciphertext withW
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Fig. 2. System architecture of SSH.
3.2.1. Security goals
• SHR conﬁdentiality. Unauthorized DU cannot obtain the plaintext
of outsourced SHRs. In particular, unauthorized access from CSP
should also be prevented.
• Collusion-resistance. Even if many DUs and CSP collude, it is infeasi-
ble for them to access the plaintext of outsourced SHRs if each one
cannot individually access.
• Batch authentication. The outsourced SHRs from diﬀerent DOs can be
eﬃciently aggregated and veriﬁed by CSP and DU. If some forged
SHRs exist, the batch authentication fails and hence invalid SHRs
are prevented to be shared by DUs.
• Non-repudiation. If DO submits a SHR to CSP for storage and sharing,
he cannot deny the fact. That is, DO is responsible for the validity
of his SHR.
• Privacy protection. CSP and DU can only aggregate the outsourced
SHRs from DOs and check the aggregated result. The actual identi-
ties of DOs cannot be known by CSP and DU. In addition, DU cannot
obtain ciphertext policies embedded in SHR ciphertexts, which pro-
tects DO’s attribute privacy.
3.2.2. Performance goals
• Communication overhead. For a desirable smart health system, the
ciphertext length and signature size of an outsourced SHR should be
as small as possible.
• Computation cost. The computation cost should be as small as possi-
ble because many smart devices are resource-constrained. In partic-
ular, time-sensitive applications in smart health such as emergency
should be taken into consideration.
3.3. Deﬁnition of anonymous certiﬁcateless aggregate signature
As an ingredient of SSH, an anonymous certiﬁcateless
aggregate signature scheme consists of seven algorithms
MasterKeyGen, UserKeyGen, PartialKeyGen, AnonSign, AnonVeri-
fy, AnonAggregate, and AnonAggVerify, which are deﬁned as
follows1 :
• MasterKeyGen(1𝜆) → (params, msk): The master key generation
algorithm is performed by RC. On input a security parameter 𝜆, it
generates a system public parameter params and a master secret
key msk.
• UserKeyGen(params) → (upkID, uskID): The user key generation
algorithm is run by DO itself. Suppose DO has an identity ID. On
input params, it generates a user public and secret key pair (upkID,
uskID).
• PartialKeyGen(params,msk, C, upkID)→ pskID: The partial user key
generation algorithm is performed by RC. On input params, msk,
a symmetric encryption ciphertext C of ID, and upkID, it returns a
partial user secret key pskID.
Fig. 3. The system initialization phase.
1 Anonymity means the actual identity of DO is not known by DUs.
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Fig. 4. The user registration phase.
• AnonSign(params, uskIDi , upkIDi , pskIDi , mi) → 𝜎i: The anonymous
signature generation algorithm is performed by DOi. Suppose DOi
has an identity IDi. On input params, uskIDi , upkIDi , pskIDi and a
message mi, it generates a signature 𝜎i.
• AnonVerify(params, mi, 𝜎 i) → true or false2 : The anonymous sig-
nature veriﬁcation algorithm is performed by CSP or DU. On input
params, mi and 𝜎i from DOi (resp. CSP) for a given i, CSP (resp. DU)
outputs true if 𝜎i is a valid signature of mi, otherwise outputs false.
• AnonAggregate(params, {mi, 𝜎i}1≤i≤n) → 𝜎: The anonymous
aggregate signature generation algorithm is performed by CSP or
DU. On input params and a message signature pair (mi, 𝜎 i) from
DOi (resp. CSP) for 1≤ i≤ n, CSP (resp. DU) generates an aggregate
signature 𝜎 on messages m1, m2, …, mn.
• AnonAggVerify(params, {mi}1≤i≤n , 𝜎)→ true or false: The anony-
mous aggregate signature veriﬁcation algorithm is performed by
CSP and DU. On input params, {mi}1≤i≤n and 𝜎, it outputs true
if 𝜎 is a valid aggregate signature on {mi}1≤i≤n, otherwise it outputs
false.
3.4. Deﬁnition of anonymous CP-ABE
Another building block of SSH is anonymous CP-ABE. An
anonymous CP-ABE scheme is composed of four algorithms
Setup, AttributeKeyGen, AnonEncrypt, and AnonDecrypt, which are
deﬁned as follows3 :
• Setup(1𝜆) → (params, msk): The system setup algorithm is run by
RC. On input a security parameter 𝜆, it generates a system public
parameter params and a master secret key msk.
• AttributeKeyGen(params, msk, L) → skL: The key generation algo-
rithm is run by RC. On input params, msk and an attribute list L, it
returns an attribute secret key skL associated with L.
• AnonEncrypt(params, m, W) → ctW: The anonymous encryption
algorithm is run by DO. On input params, a message m and a cipher-
text policy W, it outputs a ciphertext ctW of m under W, where W is
hidden in ctW.
• AnonDecrypt(params, ctW, skL)→ m or ⊥: The anonymous decryp-
tion algorithm is performed by DU. On input params, a ciphertext
ctW of message m underW, and an attribute secret key skL, it returns
⊥ and terminates if L does not match W. Otherwise, it outputs m.
4. SSH: secure smart health system integrating IoT and cloud
SSH consists of four phases: system initialization, user registration,
health data outsourcing and health data access, which are described
below.
2 The user public key upkIDi is implicitly used as a component of 𝜎i.
3 Anonymity means the access policy is hidden in ciphertexts.
4.1. System initialization
RC ﬁrst speciﬁes a security parameter 𝜆, a symmetric encryp-
tion cryptosystem (ESE, DSE), and an anonymous CP-ABE scheme
(Setup, AttributeKeyGen, AnonEncrypt, AnonDecrypt). Then, it
runs Setup(1𝜆) to get paramsABE and mskABE, and performs the
following algorithm MasterKeyGen(1𝜆) to obtain params and msk.
Finally, RC publishes paramsABE and params, and keeps mskABE and
msk secret. The initialization phase is illustrated in Fig. 3.
MasterKeyGen(1𝜆) → (params, msk): RC ﬁrst chooses a bilin-
ear map ê ∶ 𝔾 × 𝔾→ 𝔾T , where 𝔾 and 𝔾T are a cyclic additive
and a multiplicative group of the same prime order p, respectively.
Then, it chooses three hash functionsH1 ∶ 𝔾 × 𝔾 → 𝔾,H2 ∶ {0,1}∗ → 𝔾
and H3 ∶ {0,1}∗ → ℤ∗p . RC also picks s∈R ℤ∗p and computes Ppub = sP,
Q=H1(P∥Ppub), where P is a generator of 𝔾. Finally, RC sets params =⟨P,Ppub,Q, p,𝔾,𝔾T ,H1,H2,H3⟩ and msk= s.
4.2. User registration
Suppose a data owner DOi has an identity IDi and an attribute list Li,
and it intends to join SSH. As shown in Fig. 4, DOi sequentially performs
the following procedures:
(1) User-Side Preparation. DOi makes a user-side preparation based
on the algorithm UserKeyGen as below.
UserKeyGen(params)→ (upkIDi , uskIDi ): DOi chooses xi ∈R ℤ∗p and
computes Xi = xiP. Then, upkIDi = Xi and uskIDi = xi are returned.
(2) Center-Side Enrollment. DOi sends Xi and Ci =ESE(Ki, IDi∥Li) to RC
for center-side enrollment, where Ki = xiPpub.4 Upon receiving
Xi and Ci, RC performs the algorithm PartialKeyGen as below
to get pskIDi and returns it to DOi. Furthermore, RC performs the
algorithm AttributeKeyGen(paramsABE, mskABE, Li) to get skLi
and sends CLi = ESE (Ki, skLi ) to DOi. After receiving CLi , DOi can
get skLi = DSE (Ki,CLi ).
PartialKeyGen(params, msk, Ci, upkIDi ) → pskIDi : RC computes
Ki = sXi and recovers IDi∥Li =DSE(Ki, Ci). After ensuring the validity
of IDi, RC locally stores (IDi, Xi, TEi) and sends Si = sYi to DOi, where
Yi =H2(Xi∥TEi) and TEi is the expiration date of registration. In addi-
tion, RC sets pskIDi = Si.
4.3. Health data outsourcing
(1) SHR Uploading. As shown in Fig. 5, after collecting a
SHR mi, DOi speciﬁes a ciphertext policy Wi and performs
AnonEncrypt(paramsABE, mi,Wi) to get ctWi . Then, DOi chooses
4 In symmetric encryption, a hash function can be used if necessary for the
suitable value of symmetric key.
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Fig. 5. The SHR uploading phase.
a timestamp TSi and runs the algorithm AnonSign as below to
obtain 𝜎i, in which ctWi‖TSi is used as the message. Finally, DOi
sends (ctWi‖TSi, 𝜎i) to CSP.
AnonSign(params, uskIDi , upkIDi , pskIDi , ctWi‖TSi) → 𝜎i: DOi
chooses ri ∈R ℤ∗p and computes Ui = riXi, hi = H3(ctWi‖TSi‖Xi‖Ui), and
Vi = Si + rihixiPpub + xiQ. Then, DOi sets 𝜎i = ⟨Ui, Vi, Xi⟩ as the signature
on ctWi‖TSi.
(2) SHR Storage. Upon receiving (ctWi‖TSi, 𝜎i) from DOi for 1≤ i≤ n,
CSP ﬁrst checks the freshness of TSi, and if it is fresh, CSP ensures
the signature component Xi has not expired. Then, CSP performs
the algorithm AnonAggregate as below to obtain the aggregate
signature 𝜎. Finally, CSP runs the algorithm AnonAggVerify as
below to check the validity of 𝜎. If and only if AnonAggVerify
returns true, CSP stores {ctWi ,TSi,TEi, 𝜎i}1≤i≤n.
AnonAggregate(params, {ctWi ,TSi,TEi, 𝜎i}1≤i≤n) → 𝜎: For
1≤ i≤ n, CSP computes hi = H3(ctWi‖TSi‖Xi‖Ui), Yi =H2(Xi∥TEi) and
generates 𝜎= ⟨U, V, X, Y ⟩, where
U =
∑
1≤i≤n
hiUi,V =
∑
1≤i≤n
Vi,X =
∑
1≤i≤n
Xi,Y =
∑
1≤i≤n
Yi.
AnonAggVerify(params, {ctWi ,TSi}1≤i≤n, 𝜎) → true or false: CSP
returns true to indicate {ctWi ,TSi}1≤i≤n are valid if and only if ê(V,
P) = ê(Y+U, Ppub )̂e(X, Q).
4.4. Health data access
As shown in Fig. 6, DU downloads outsourced SHR data
{ctWi ,TSi,TEi, 𝜎i}1≤i≤n from CSP. In order to access SHRs, DU performs
Algorithm 1.
AnonVerify(params, ctWi , TSi, TEi, 𝜎i) → true or false: DU
ﬁrst ensures TSi is fresh and the signature component Xi has not
expired. Then, DU computes hi = H3(ctWi‖TSi‖Xi‖Ui), Yi =H2(Xi∥TEi),
and checks if ê(Vi, P) = ê(Yi + hiUi, Ppub )̂e(Xi, Q). If it holds, true is
returned.
5. Security analysis
In SSH, an anonymous certiﬁcateless aggregate signature scheme,
an anonymous CP-ABE scheme and a symmetric encryption scheme are
used, in which the encryption schemes have been proven secure. As
shown in Section 3.2, the security goals of SSH are SHR conﬁdential-
ity, collusion-resistance, batch authentication, non-repudiation, and privacy
protection. The security of the adopted CP-ABE scheme realizes SHR
conﬁdentiality and collusion-resistance. Furthermore, identity anonymity is
enabled based on the symmetric encryption technology. Therefore, in
the following, we only need to prove the security of the underlying sig-
nature scheme, which ensures batch authentication and non-repudiation
of SSH.
5.1. Formalized security model
We consider such a security model that no entity is fully trusted
by the others. In Au et al. (2007), a formalized security model of cer-
tiﬁcateless signature is described, in which the adversary can launch
attacks before generating a system public parameter. Concretely, two
types of adversaries should be taken into account.
• Type I Adversary I. It is capable of replacing the public key of
other entities with a value of his choice, but is not allowed to access
the master secret key.
• Type II AdversaryII. It is allowed to access the master secret key,
but cannot make public key replacement.
Because identity is encrypted based on a symmetric encryption mech-
anism in SSH, we further consider aggregation in our security model.
In fact, our formalized security model is similar to the one in Au et al.
(2007) and the diﬀerence lies in that the algorithms AnonAggregate
and AnonAggVerify are performed to aggregate and check signatures.
5.2. Security results
Theorem 1. For type I adversaries, SSH is existentially unforgeable against
adaptively chosen-message attacks in the random oracle model under the
CDH assumption.
Proof. Given a random CDH instance (P, aP, bP) ∈ 𝔾3, where
a, b∈R ℤ∗p , the goal of  is to compute abP ∈ 𝔾. Denote aP and bP by A
and B, respectively. Suppose there is a type I adversary I that breaks
SSH in time t1 with advantage 𝜖1. In the following, we show that I
is used as a subroutine by the challenger  to solve the CDH problem
with advantage 𝜖 in time t after making qi queries to Hi for i= 1,2,3,
qus user secret key queries, qps partial secret key queries, qpk public key
queries, qsig signing queries, and qas aggregate signing queries, where
𝜖 ≥
𝜖1
(qps + 1)e
and t ≤ t1
+(q1 + q2 + q3 + qus + qps + qpk + qsig + nqas)Tm.
Here, e is the base of the natural logarithm, n represents the number
of aggregated signatures, and Tm is the computation time of a scalar
multiplication operation in 𝔾.
Init.  sets Ppub =A, Q=H1(P∥Ppub) and sends params =⟨P,Ppub,Q, p,𝔾, 𝔾T ,H1,H2,H3⟩ to I , in which H1, H2, H3 are
answered by  in the following queries. A list  = (IDi, xi, Si,Xi) is main-
tained by  and the symbol ⊥means the corresponding value is invalid.
Queries on Oracle H1.  maintains a list 1 = (P,Ppub, cQ,Q) which
is initially empty. Upon receiving a query (P, Ppub) on H1 from I , 
Fig. 6. The health data access phase.
94
Y. Zhang et al. Journal of Network and Computer Applications 123 (2018) 89–100
Algorithm 1 Health data access.
returns the same value if the query has ever been made. Otherwise, 
chooses cQ ∈R ℤ∗p , returns Q= cQP and adds (P, Ppub, cQ, Q) to 1.
Queries on Oracle H2.  maintains a list 2 = (Xi,TEi, ci, yi,Yi)
which is initially empty. Upon receiving a query (Xi, TEi),  answers
as follows:
• If the query exists in 2, the corresponding Yi is returned.
• Otherwise,  ﬂips a coin ci ∈ {0,1} such that ci =0 with probabil-
ity 𝜇 and ci =1 with probability 1−𝜇. Then,  chooses yi ∈R ℤ∗p . If
ci =0,  sets Yi = yiB. Otherwise, ci =1, it sets Yi = yiP. In both cases,
 inserts (Xi, TEi, ci, yi, Yi) to 2.
Queries on Oracle H3.  maintains a list 3 = (ctWi ,TSi,Xi,Ui, hi)
which is initially empty. Upon receiving a query (ctWi ,TSi,Xi,Ui), 
returns the same value if the query has ever been made. Otherwise, 
chooses hi ∈R ℤ∗p , returns hi and adds (ctWi ,TSi,Xi,Ui, hi) to 3.
User Secret Key Queries. Suppose I makes a query on identity
IDi.  answers as follows:
• If (IDi, xi, Si, Xi) is included in ,  does the following:
– If xi =⊥,  chooses xi ∈R ℤ∗p , returns xi, sets Xi = xiP and adds (IDi,
xi, Si, Xi) to .
– Otherwise, xi ≠ ⊥,  returns xi.
• If (IDi, xi, Si, Xi) is not included in ,  chooses xi ∈R ℤ∗p , returns xi,
sets Xi = xiP and adds (IDi, xi, Si, Xi) to .
Partial Secret Key Queries. Suppose I makes a query on (Xi, TEi). 
retrieves (Xi, TEi, ci, yi, Yi) from 2 and answers as follows:
• If ci =0,  returns failure.
• If ci =1 and (IDi, xi, Si, Xi) is included in ,  does the following:
– If Si ≠ ⊥,  returns Si.
– If Si =⊥, we know Yi = yiP.  sets Si = yiPpub, returns Si and adds
(IDi, xi, Si, Xi) to .
• If ci =1 and (IDi, xi, Si, Xi) is not included in ,  sets Si = yiPpub,
returns Si and adds (IDi, xi, Si, Xi) to .
Public Key Queries. Suppose I makes a public key query on identity
IDi.  answers as follows:
• If (IDi, xi, Si, Xi) is included in ,  retrieves (Xi, TEi, ci, yi, Yi) from
2 and does the following:
– If ci =0,  updates (IDi, xi, Si, Xi) in  by setting Xi =B, xi =⊥,
and returns Xi.
– If ci =1,  does the following:
∗ If Xi =⊥,  chooses xi ∈R ℤ∗p , sets Xi = xiP, returns Xi, and adds
(IDi, xi, Si, Xi) to .
∗ Otherwise, Xi ≠ ⊥,  returns Xi.
• If (IDi, xi, Si, Xi) is not included in ,  sets Si =⊥, chooses xi ∈R ℤ∗p ,
computes Xi = xiP, returns Xi, and adds (IDi, xi, Si, Xi) to .
Replace Public Key Queries. Suppose I chooses a new public key X′i
for identity IDi.  answers as follows:
• If (IDi, xi, Si, Xi) is included in ,  updates  by setting Xi = X′i and
xi =⊥.
• If (IDi, xi, Si, Xi) is not included in ,  sets Xi = X′i , xi =⊥, Si =⊥
and adds (IDi, xi, Si, Xi) to .
Signing Queries. Suppose I makes a signing query on (IDi, ctWi ,TSi).
Based on , 1, 2 and 3,  can generate signatures for I . If  does
not contain an item (IDi, xi, Si, Xi) with Xi ≠ ⊥,  performs a public key
query on IDi to get (xi, Xi). Then,  retrieves the corresponding item
(Xi, TEi, ci, yi, Yi) from 2, and does the following:
• If ci =1 and xi ≠ ⊥, the signature can be directly generated. Speciﬁ-
cally,  performs:
– Choose ri ∈R ℤ∗p and compute Ui = riXi.
– Generate hi = H3(ctWi‖TSi‖Xi‖Ui) based on the oracle H3.
– Set Vi = Si + rihixiPpub + xiQ, where Q is obtained from 1.
– Return 𝜎i = (Ui, Vi, Xi).
Obviously, 𝜎i is a valid signature on ctWi‖TSi because:
ê(Vi,P) = ê(Si + rihixiPpub + xiQ,P)
= ê(Yi + hiUi,Ppub)̂e(Xi,Q).
• Otherwise,  performs:
– Get (Xi, TEi, ci, yi, Yi) from 2. We know Yi = yiB.
– Choose ri, hi ∈R ℤ∗p and compute Ui = h−1i (riP− yiXi). Deﬁne
H3(ctWi‖TSi‖Xi‖Ui) as hi. Note that if H3(ctWi‖TSi‖Xi‖Ui) has
already been deﬁned as other value,  returns failure.
– Set Vi = riPpub + cQXi, where cQ is obtained from 1.
– Return 𝜎i = (Ui, Vi, Xi).
𝜎i is a valid signature on ctWi‖TSi because:
ê(Vi,P) = ê(riPpub + cQXi,P)
= ê(riP,Ppub)̂e(cQXi,P)
= ê(yiXi + hiUi,Ppub)̂e(Xi, cQP)
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= ê(yiB+ hiUi,Ppub)̂e(Xi,Q)
= ê(Yi + hiUi,Ppub )̂e(Xi,Q).
Aggregate Signing Queries. It can be directly realized based on Sign-
ing Queries and the speciﬁcation of SSH.
Forgery. Suppose I outputs a forgery (ctWi ,TSi,Ui,Vi,Xi). 
retrieves (Xi, TEi, ci, yi, Yi) from 2. If ci =1,  returns failure. Oth-
erwise,  replays I with a diﬀerent choice of H3 and the same choice
of H1 and H2. According the forking lemma,  can get another forgery
(ctWi ,TSi,Ui,V′i ,Xi) within polynomial time, where V′i ≠ Vi because
h′i ≠ hi for the two choices of H3 on (tWi ,TSi,Xi,Ui).
Solving the CDH Problem. Suppose the forgeries are valid. Then,
ê(Vi,P) = ê(Yi + hiUi,Ppub )̂e(Xi,Q), ê(V′i ,P)
= ê(Yi + h′i Ui,Ppub )̂e(Xi,Q),
where Q is obtained from 1. To be speciﬁc,
ê(Vi,P) = ê(Si + rihixiPpub + xiQ,P), ê(V′i ,P)
= ê(Si + rih′i xiPpub + xiQ,P).
Hence,
Vi = Si + rihixiPpub + xiQ, (1)
V′i = Si + rih′i xiPpub + xiQ. (2)
Multiplying both sides of Equation (1) by h−1i and both sides of Equation
(2) by h′−1i , we have
h−1i Vi = h−1i Si + rixiPpub + h−1i xiQ, (3)
h′−1i V′i = h′−1i Si + rixiPpub + h′−1i xiQ. (4)
Based on Equations (3) and (4), we have
h−1i Vi − h′−1i V′i = (h−1i − h′−1i )(Si + xiQ),
where Si = aYi and Yi = yiB. Therefore,  can solve the CDH instance by
computing
abP = y−1i
(
(h−1i − h′−1i )−1(h−1i Vi − h′−1i V′i ) − xiQ
)
.
Probability and Time Complexity. In the above process,  succeeds if
the following three events occur.
• E1:  does not return failure in any partial secret key queries from
I .
• E2: The forgeries from I are veriﬁed to be valid.
• E3: E2 occurs and  does not return failure.
It easily follows that Pr [E1] ≥ (1− 𝜇)qps , Pr [E2|E1] ≥ 𝜖1, and
Pr [E3|E1 ∧ E2] ≥ 𝜇. Accordingly,
Pr [E1 ∧ E2 ∧ E3] = Pr [E1] · Pr [E2|E1] · Pr [E3|E1 ∧ E2]
≥ (1− 𝜇)qps𝜖1𝜇.
For the optimal value of 𝜇 = 1qps+1 , we know
𝜖 ≥
𝜖1
(qps + 1)e
.
In addition, t ≤ t1 +(q1 + q2 + q3 + qus + qps + qpk + qsig + qas)Tm. ■
Theorem 2. For type II adversaries, SSH is existentially unforgeable
against adaptively chosen-message attacks in the random oracle model under
the CDH assumption.
Proof Sketch. As for type II adversaries, the Replace Public Key Queries
cannot be made. In this case, the CDH instance can be integrated into
the Public Key Queries. In addition, because the adversary is able to
access the master secret key, the Partial Secret Key Queries are not
needed. The other queries can be answered by the challenger similar
to the case of type I adversaries. ■
6. Performance evaluation
6.1. Performance analysis and feature comparison
In this section, we compare the performance and features of SSH
and typical aggregate signature schemes including Selvi et al.’s scheme
(Selvi et al., 2012), Shen et al.’s scheme (Shen et al., 2017), Malhi et
al.’s scheme (Malhi and Batra, 2015), Xiong et al.’s scheme (Xiong et
al., 2013), Tu et al.’s scheme (Tu et al., 2014), and Li et al.’s scheme
(Li et al., 2018b). As shown in Table 2, we analyze the computation
cost in terms of the basic cryptographic operations involved in signing,
veriﬁcation, aggregate veriﬁcation. The features are taken into consid-
eration such as key-escrow free, batch authentication, non-repudiation,
and privacy protection. In the signing phase, the computation of our
scheme is 3SM+H, which is less than 4SM+H of Malhi and Batra
(2015), 3SM + 4H of Tu et al. (2014), and 5SM + 3H of Li et al.
(2018b). Although the scheme (Selvi et al., 2012; Shen et al., 2017)
only needs Exp + 2H and 2SM+H, respectively. These schemes can-
not realize key-escrow free authentication and suﬀer severe eﬃciency
drawbacks in aggregate veriﬁcation. At a matter of fact, in veriﬁcation,
our scheme needs 3Pair+SM +2H, which is less than 3Pair +3SM +2H
of Malhi and Batra (2015), 3Pair + 2SM + 2H of Xiong et al. (2013),
4Pair + 2SM + 5H of Tu et al. (2014), and 3Pair + 2SM + 4H of
Li et al. (2018b). In particular, in aggregate veriﬁcation, the proposed
scheme only performs three pairing operations, which is constant and
far less than that of the other schemes. As for security features, only
the schemes (Malhi and Batra, 2015; Xiong et al., 2013; Tu et al., 2014;
Li et al., 2018b) and our SSH realize key-escrow free authentication.
Table 2
Comparisons of aggregate signature schemes.
Schemes Signing Veriﬁcation Aggregate Veriﬁcation KEFA† BA NR PP
Selvi et al. (2012) Exp + 2H 4Exp + 3H (7n + 1)Exp + (4n−1)M + 2 nH × – ✓ ×
Shen et al. (2017) 2SM+H 3Pair‡ + 2H+M (n + 2)Pair + 4ExpT + (n−1)M+ nMT + (n + 2)H × – ✓ ×
Malhi and Batra (2015) 4SM+H 3Pair + 3SM + 2H 3Pair + 3nSM + 2H ✓ ✓ ✓ ×
Xiong et al. (2013) 3SM+H 3Pair + 2SM + 2H 3Pair + 2nSM ✓ −a −a ×
Tu et al. (2014) 3SM + 4H 4Pair + 2SM + 5H 4Pair + 2nSM ✓ ✓ ✓ −b
Li et al. (2018b) 5SM + 3H 3Pair + 2SM + 4H 3Pair + 2nSM + 4 nH+MT ✓ ✓ ✓ ×
Ours 3SM+H 3Pair+SM + 2H 3Pair ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
† KEFA: Key-escrow Free Authentication; BA: Batch Authentication; NR: Non-repudiation; PP: Privacy Protection.
‡ Pair: A bilinear pairing operation; Exp (resp. ExpT): An exponentiation operation in group 𝔾 (resp. 𝔾T ); SM: A scalar multiplication operation in group 𝔾; M
(resp. MT): A multiplication operation in group 𝔾 (resp. 𝔾T); H: A hash operation.
a As shown in He et al. (2014), it cannot resist the Type II adversary.
b It is based on the use of pseudonyms and hence limits the practical applications of the system.
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Fig. 7. The computation cost based on a laptop.
Fig. 8. The computation cost based on a mobile phone.
Fig. 9. The aggregate veriﬁcation time.
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Fig. 10. The communication cost from RC to DO.
In He et al. (2014), the authors showed that the scheme (Xiong et al.,
2013) cannot resist the Type II adversary, and hence the batch authen-
tication and non-repudiation are not realized in essence. The schemes
(Selvi et al., 2012; Shen et al., 2017; Malhi and Batra, 2015; Xiong et al.,
2013; Li et al., 2018b) fail to realize privacy protection. The scheme (Tu
et al., 2014) realizes privacy protection based on the trivial technique
of pseudonyms and hence has limited practical applications. In general,
only our SSH enables users’ privacy protection and SHR conﬁdentiality.
In the following, we further compares the computation cost and com-
munication overhead of SSH and the schemes (Malhi and Batra, 2015;
Tu et al., 2014; Xiong et al., 2013; Li et al., 2018b).
6.2. Computation cost
In this section, we show the variation of signing time and veriﬁca-
tion time with the increase of SHRs. We conduct experiments based on
a laptop and a mobile phone. The laptop-based experiment uses a vir-
tual machine with 64 bit Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, which has two processors
of Intel Core i7-7820HK CPU @ 2.9GHz and memory of 5.8GB. The
mobile phone-based experiment is run on XiaoMi 5s with Qualcomm
Snapdragon 821 of 4 processors and 2.15GHz. The operation system
is MIUI v9.5 (Android 7.0). Note that, for clearness, the vertical axis
is log scale in the following ﬁgures. As shown in Fig. 7, we compare
the computation time of signing and veriﬁcation of schemes (Malhi and
Batra, 2015; Tu et al., 2014; Xiong et al., 2013; Li et al., 2018b) and
SSH based on a laptop. In the Fig. 7a, when the number of SHRs is 1,
the computation time is about 60ms and the time increases to about
10 s when there are 100 SHRs. The signing time of SSH is lowest. In the
Fig. 7b, when the number of SHRs is 1, the computation time is about
70ms and the time increases with the number of SHRs. The veriﬁcation
time of SSH is lowest. In practical applications, DO an DU can be smart
mobile devices, which are resource-constrained to some extent. There-
fore, we further compare the computation time of signing and veriﬁca-
tion of schemes (Malhi and Batra, 2015; Tu et al., 2014; Xiong et al.,
2013; Li et al., 2018b) and SSH based on a smartphone in Fig. 8. In the
Fig. 8a, when the number of SHRs is 1, the computation time is about
300ms and the time is more than 20 s when there are 100 SHRs. The
veriﬁcation time of SSH is lowest. In the Fig. 8b, when the number of
SHRs is 1, the computation time is about 500ms and the time increases
to about 50 s when the number of SHRs is 100. The veriﬁcation time of
SSH is still lowest.
In the signing and veriﬁcation, aggregation is not taken into
account. In practice, if there are many SHRs, to improve the authen-
tication eﬃciency and make the system suitable for time-sensitive use
case such as emergency, it is necessary to perform aggregation veriﬁca-
tion. In Fig. 9, we compare the aggregate veriﬁcation time of schemes
(Malhi and Batra, 2015; Tu et al., 2014; Xiong et al., 2013; Li et al.,
2018b) and SSH. The results based on a laptop and a mobile phone are
shown in Fig. 9a and b, respectively. Obviously, in both cases, our SSH
is most eﬃcient and the computation time is small and almost constant.
The aggregate veriﬁcation time of the other schemes increases with the
number of SHRs.
6.3. Communication overhead
Because only our SSH realizes users’ privacy protection and SHR
ﬁne-grained access control, and SSH is most eﬃcient in terms of the
computation cost. In the following, we further show the communica-
tion overhead of SSH. In the registration phase, RC needs to returns
Fig. 11. The communication cost from DO to CSP.
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secret keys to DO. In this case, we consider the communication over-
head from RC to DO, which is introduced by the transmission of an
attribute secret key and a partial secret key. In Fig. 10, we can see that
the communication cost from RC to DO is only related to the number
of attributes. In Fig. 11, we further consider the communication over-
head from DO to CSP. According to the design of SSH, we know that
DO uploads many SHRs to CSP for storage and sharing. We consider
the cases of SHR conﬁdentiality in Fig. 11a and no SHR conﬁdentiality
in Fig. 11b. In Fig. 11a, it follows that the communication overhead is
determined by both the number of attributes and the number of SHRs.
In Fig. 11b, we know that the communication overhead is only aﬀected
by the number of SHRs.
Generally speaking, the proposed scheme is more suitable for smart
health based on IoT and cloud computing.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we successfully addressed data security and user pri-
vacy issues in smart health by introducing SSH, a secure smart health
system with privacy-aware aggregate authentication and access con-
trol for IoT. The main building blocks of SSH include an anonymous
certiﬁcateless aggregate signature and an anonymous CP-ABE scheme.
In SSH, users’ identity information and sensitive attributes are hidden
and hence privacy is preserved. The cloud service provider can check
the uploaded SHRs from diﬀerent users at one time, which is suit-
able for time-sensitive scenarios in smart health. In the random oracle
model, we proved that SSH is existentially unforgeable against adap-
tively chosen-message attacks, which can prevent invalid SHRs from
being uploaded to the cloud. Comprehensive theoretical analysis and
extensive simulation results indicated that SSH is eﬃcient in terms of
computation cost and communication cost.
Acknowledgment
This work is supported by the National Key R&D Program of China
(2017YFB0802000), the AXA Research Fund, the National Natural Sci-
ence Foundation of China (Nos. 61772418, 61472472, 61402366), the
Natural Science Basic Research Plan in Shaanxi Province of China (Nos.
2018JZ6001, 2015JQ6236). Yinghui Zhang is supported by New Star
Team of Xi’an University of Posts & Telecommunications (2016-02).
References
Au, M.H., Mu, Y., Chen, J., Wong, D.S., Liu, J.K., Yang, G., 2007. Malicious kgc attacks
in certiﬁcateless cryptography. In: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Symposium on
Information, Computer and Communications Security. ACM, pp. 302–311.
Boneh, D., Gentry, C., Lynn, B., Shacham, H., 2003. Aggregate and veriﬁably encrypted
signatures from bilinear maps. In: International Conference on the Theory and
Applications of Cryptographic Techniques. Springer, pp. 416–432.
Cai, Z., Yan, H., Li, P., Huang, Z.-a., Gao, C., 2017. Towards secure and ﬂexible ehr
sharing in mobile health cloud under static assumptions. Cluster Comput. 20 (3),
2415–2422.
Castiglione, A., De Santis, A., Masucci, B., Palmieri, F., Castiglione, A., Li, J., Huang, X.,
2016. Hierarchical and shared access control. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 11
(4), 850–865.
Castro, R., Dahab, R., 2007. Eﬃcient certiﬁcateless signatures suitable for aggregation.
IACR Cryptol. ePrint Archive 454, 1–24.
Chen, X., Li, J., Weng, J., Ma, J., Lou, W., 2016. Veriﬁable computation over large
database with incremental updates. IEEE Trans. Comput. 65 (10), 3184–3195.
Chu, C.K., Chow, S.S., Tzeng, W.G., Zhou, J., Deng, R.H., 2014. Key-aggregate
cryptosystem for scalable data sharing in cloud storage. IEEE Trans. Parallel Distr.
Syst. 25 (2), 468–477.
Fan, L., Lei, X., Yang, N., Duong, T.Q., Karagiannidis, G.K., 2017. Secrecy cooperative
networks with outdated relay selection over correlated fading channels. IEEE Trans.
Veh. Technol. 66 (8), 7599–7603.
Goyal, V., Pandey, O., Sahai, A., Waters, B., 2006. Attribute-based encryption for
ﬁne-grained access control of encrypted data. In: Proceedings of the 13th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS’06. ACM, New York,
pp. 89–98.
He, D., Tian, M., Chen, J., 2014. Insecurity of an eﬃcient certiﬁcateless aggregate
signature with constant pairing computations. Inf. Sci. 268, 458–462.
Jhaveri, R.H., Patel, N.M., Zhong, Y., Sangaiah, A.K., 2018. Sensitivity analysis of an
attack-pattern discovery based trusted routing scheme for mobile ad-hoc networks
in industrial iot. IEEE Access 6, 20085–20103.
Jiang, T., Chen, X., Li, J., Wong, D.S., Ma, J., Liu, J.K., 2015. Towards secure and reliable
cloud storage against data re-outsourcing. Future Generat. Comput. Syst. 52, 86–94.
Li, J., Li, Y.K., Chen, X., Lee, P.P., Lou, W., 2015. A hybrid cloud approach for secure
authorized deduplication. IEEE Trans. Parallel Distr. Syst. 26 (5), 1206–1216.
Li, J., Chen, X., Chow, S.S., Huang, Q., Wong, D.S., Liu, Z., 2018. Multi-authority
ﬁne-grained access control with accountability and its application in cloud. J. Netw.
Comput. Appl. 112, 89–96.
Li, J., Yuan, H., Zhang, Y., 2018. Cryptanalysis and improvement for certiﬁcateless
aggregate signature. Fundam. Inf. 157 (1–2), 111–123.
Liu, J., Cao, H., Li, Q., Cai, F., Du, X., Guizani, M., 2018. A large-scale concurrent data
anonymous batch veriﬁcation scheme for mobile healthcare crowd sensing. IEEE
Internet Things J., https://doi.org/10.1109/JIOT.2018.2828463.
Malhi, A.K., Batra, S., 2015. An eﬃcient certiﬁcateless aggregate signature scheme for
vehicular ad-hoc networks. Discrete Math. Theor. Comput. Sci. 17 (1), 317.
Sahai, A., Waters, B., 2005. Fuzzy identity-based encryption. In: Cramer, R. (Ed.),
Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT’05, Vol. 3494 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science. Springer, Berlin-Heidelberg, p. 557.
Selvi, S.S.D., Vivek, S.S., Shriram, J., Rangan, C.P., 2012. Identity based partial
aggregate signature scheme without pairing. In: Sarnoﬀ Symposium (SARNOFF),
2012 35th IEEE. IEEE, pp. 1–6.
Shen, L., Ma, J., Liu, X., Wei, F., Miao, M., 2017. A secure and eﬃcient id-based
aggregate signature scheme for wireless sensor networks. IEEE Internet Things J. 4
(2), 546–554.
Shen, J., Gui, Z., Ji, S., Shen, J., Tan, H., Tang, Y., 2018. Cloud-aided lightweight
certiﬁcateless authentication protocol with anonymity for wireless body area
networks. J. Netw. Comput. Appl. 106, 117–123.
Shen, J., Wang, C., Li, T., Chen, X., Huang, X., Zhan, Z.-H., 2018. Secure data uploading
scheme for a smart home system. Inf. Sci. 453, 186–197.
Shu, J., Jia, X., Yang, K., Wang, W., 2018. Privacy-preserving task recommendation
services for crowdsourcing. IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput., https://doi.org/10.1109/
TSC.2018.2791601.
Shu, J., Liu, X., Jia, X., Yang, K., Deng, R.H., 2018. Anonymous privacy-preserving task
matching in crowdsourcing. IEEE Internet Things J. 5 (4), 3068–3078.
Tu, H., He, D., Huang, B., 2014. Reattack of a certiﬁcateless aggregate signature scheme
with constant pairing computations. Sci. World J. 2014, 1–10.
Wang, Q., Wang, C., Ren, K., Lou, W., Li, J., 2011. Enabling public auditability and data
dynamics for storage security in cloud computing. IEEE Trans. Parallel Distr. Syst.
22 (5), 847–859.
Wang, H., Zheng, Z., Wu, L., Li, P., 2017. New directly revocable attribute-based
encryption scheme and its application in cloud storage environment. Cluster
Comput. 20 (3), 2385–2392.
Wang, C., Shen, J., Liu, Q., Ren, Y., Li, T., 2018. A novel security scheme based on
instant encrypted transmission for internet of things. Secur. Commun. Network.
2018, 1–7.
Wu, Z., Tian, L., Li, P., Wu, T., Jiang, M., Wu, C., 2018. Generating stable biometric keys
for ﬂexible cloud computing authentication using ﬁnger vein. Inf. Sci. 433–434,
431–447.
Xhafa, F., Feng, J., Zhang, Y., Chen, X., Li, J., 2015. Privacy-aware attribute-based phr
sharing with user accountability in cloud computing. J. Supercomput. 71 (5),
1607–1619.
Xiong, H., Guan, Z., Chen, Z., Li, F., 2013. An eﬃcient certiﬁcateless aggregate signature
with constant pairing computations. Inf. Sci. 219, 225–235.
Xu, J., Wei, L., Zhang, Y., Wang, A., Zhou, F., Gao, C.-z., 2018. Dynamic fully
homomorphic encryption-based merkle tree for lightweight streaming authenticated
data structures. J. Netw. Comput. Appl. 107, 113–124.
Yang, L., Han, Z., Huang, Z., Ma, J., 2018. A remotely keyed ﬁle encryption scheme
under mobile cloud computing. J. Netw. Comput. Appl. 106, 90–99.
Zhang, Y., Chen, X., Li, J., Li, H., 2014. Generic construction for secure and eﬃcient
handoﬀ authentication schemes in eap-based wireless networks. Comput. Network.
75, 192–211.
Zhang, Y., Zheng, D., Li, Q., Li, J., Li, H., 2016. Online/oﬄine unbounded
multi-authority attribute-based encryption for data sharing in mobile cloud
computing. Secur. Commun. Network. 9 (16), 3688–3702.
Zhang, Y., Zheng, D., Chen, X., Li, J., Li, H., 2016. Eﬃcient attribute-based data sharing
in mobile clouds. Pervasive Mob. Comput. 28, 135–149.
Zhang, Y., Chen, X., Li, J., Wong, D.S., Li, H., You, I., 2017. Ensuring attribute privacy
protection and fast decryption for outsourced data security in mobile cloud
computing. Inf. Sci. 379, 42–61.
Zhang, Y., Wu, A., Zheng, D., 2018. Eﬃcient and privacy-aware attribute-based data
sharing in mobile cloud computing. J. Ambient Intell. Humanized Comput. 9 (4),
1039–1048.
Zhang, Y., Deng, R.H., Shu, J., Yang, K., Zheng, D., 2018. TKSE: trustworthy keyword
search over encrypted data with two-side veriﬁability via blockchain. IEEE Access 6
(1), 31077–31087.
Zhang, Y., Deng, R.H., Liu, X., Zheng, D., 2018. Blockchain based eﬃcient and robust
fair payment for outsourcing services in cloud computing. Inf. Sci. 462, 262–277.
Zhang, Y., Deng, R.H., Liu, X., Zheng, D., 2018. Outsourcing service fair payment based
on blockchain and its application in cloud computing. IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput.,
https://doi.org/10.1109/TSC.2018.2864191.
Zhang, Y., Zheng, D., Guo, R., Zhao, Q., 2018. Fine-grained access control systems
suitable for resource-constrained users in cloud computing. Comput. Inf. 37 (2),
327–348.
Zhang, Y., Yang, M., Zheng, D., Lang, P., Wu, A., Chen, C., 2018. Eﬃcient and secure big
data storage system with leakage resilience in cloud computing. Soft Comput.,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00500-018-3435-z.
99
Y. Zhang et al. Journal of Network and Computer Applications 123 (2018) 89–100
Zhang, Y., Shu, J., Liu, X., Li, J., Zheng, D., 2018. Security analysis of a large-scale
concurrent data anonymous batch veriﬁcation scheme for mobile healthcare crowd
sensing. IEEE Internet Things J., https://doi.org/10.1109/JIOT.2018.2862381.
Zhang, Y., Zheng, D., Deng, R.H., 2018. Security and privacy in smart health: eﬃcient
policy-hiding attribute-based access control. IEEE Internet Things J. 5 (3),
2130–2145.
Zhang, Y., Li, J., Zheng, D., Li, P., Tian, Y., 2018i. Privacy-preserving communication
and power injection over vehicle networks and 5G smart grid slice. J. Netw.
Comput. Appl. 122, 50–60.
Yinghui Zhang is currently an associate professor at National
Engineering Laboratory for Wireless Security, Xi’an University
of Posts and Telecommunications, China. He obtained his Ph.D
degree from Xidian University, China, in 2013. His current
research includes cloud computing security, access control,
security and privacy in IoT, etc. He has published more than
60 papers on the topics of cloud security, access control, and
IoT security. He served for the program committee of several
conferences and the editorial members of several international
journals in information security. He is a member of IEEE and
ACM.
Robert H. Deng is AXA Chair Professor of Cybersecurity and
Professor of Information Systems in the School of Informa-
tion Systems, Singapore Management University since 2004.
His research interests include data security and privacy, mul-
timedia security, network and system security. He served/is
serving on the editorial boards of many international journals
in security, including the IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on Dependable and
Secure Computing, and IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine.
He is a fellow of the IEEE.
Gang Han is currently a Ph.D. student in Northwestern Poly-
technical University, China. He received the B.S degree from
Northwestern Polytechnical University, China, in 2013, and
the M.S. degree from Northwestern Polytechnical University,
China, in 2016. Now, he is pursuing his Ph.D. degree in
Northwestern Polytechnical University. His current research
includes security and privacy in the Internet of Things, cloud
computing security, and wireless network security.
Dong Zheng received his Ph.D. degree in communication
engineering from Xidian University, China, in 1999. He is cur-
rently a Professor at National Engineering Laboratory for Wire-
less Security (NELWS), Xi’an University of Posts and Telecom-
munications. His current research includes cloud comput-
ing security, wireless network security, code-based cryptog-
raphy, access control, security and privacy in IoT, etc. He has
published over 100 research articles including CT-RSA, IEEE
Transactions on Services Computing, etc.
100
